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“Empire” and
“hegemony”
(ba) originally had both moral and political
functional connotations, which were similar in classical Greece, Rome, and
China. Later, extreme moralization stripped the sense of eminence from “ba” and reduced
the hegemon to an immoral brute. Because “ba” is now a bad word, the notion of American
hegemony invokes an a priori negative image in Chinese eyes.
The
image of empire, once glorious, was tarnished in the post-war wave of
decolonization. Although it regained some luster after the American-led
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, many Americans still find it
distasteful. Thus even as some talks of the American Empire,[1] others, such as
candidate George W. Bush, declared: “America has never been an empire.”
Instead of empire, they talk of world leadership, or, in more academic
terms, hegemony[2]. The United
States is “the sole example of geopolitical hegemony since the fall of
Rome,” writes the historian of economics Patrick O’Brien. “Since Rome only
the government of the United States has set out to formulate and enforce
rules for the operational of an international system and utilized its
considerable military, naval, economic and cultural resources to command,
implicitly coerce and/or persuade other states to abide by these rules.”[3]
From
the People’s Republic of China, which is fast rising in global geopolitics,
people have another view. Yan Xuetong, a leading
international-relations scholar, scoffs at the notion of America hegemony
or “benevolent empire” as “cosmetic propaganda,” because it is “unable to
propose a concept of international benevolent authority corresponding to
hegemonic power.”[4] Just as
westerners refer to ancient Rome, the Chinese refer to ideas from the time
before the unification of China, the time coincided with the Roman
Republic. At that time, China was divided into many antagonistic states. Practices
in inter-state relations produced the empirical notions of the hegemon, ba 霸and the king, wang 王. Since then, extreme moralization has made ba and wang into ideological notions that are polar opposites. In the
ideological sense, Yan notes that “the core difference between the two was
in morality” and proposes “kingly way” wangdao for today’s international
relations.
In the West, the
notion of hegemony that originated from the practice of the ancient Greeks
carried an intrinsic sense of moral authority. In terms of morality and
political function, its connotations were similar to that of the empirical
notion ba.
Thus “hegemony” is translated as “ba’’. However, whereas the classical sense of hegemony
persists in the West, the notion of ba in China had undergone a dramatic degradation in the
hands of ideological Confucians and come to mean an immoral brute. The ideological
sense has stuck. Thus, whereas American hegemony meaning a benevolent
empire makes sense in the West, it appears to be an oxymoron in Chinese
eyes.
This article
tries to examine the empirical meanings of “empire”, “hegemony”, “wang” and “ba”, together with the evolution of
their meanings. Perhaps it can reduce confusion and misunderstanding.
Political functions
The empirical
notions produced in historical inter-state relations have both moral and
political functional meanings. The king is a ruler of people, the hegemon
is a leader of allies. Each have certain moral standards in discharging
their political functions. Strictly speaking, the king’s main job is in
internal government. However, this paper is mainly on international
relations. Thus we shall focus on foreign policies, especially the
domination of other peoples and occupation of other’s territories, in other
words, the king’s imperium,
empire.
What
is an empire? None of the common notions of empire fits all of the 68 empires found in the Times Atlas of World History. An
empire is ruled by an emperor, but the Athenian Empire was ruled by a
democracy and Rome’s empire was acquired under the Republic. An empire
implies domination, in which a state controls other peoples or communities
to its own advantage, whether or not decorated by altruistic rouge.
However, for most periods during its long history, imperial China made
almost no political distinction among its denizens, nor did the Roman
Empire after 212, when all free inhabitants became citizens. An empire is a
territorial state that can be colored red or blue on a map. However,
dominion can obtain without direct rule, as the Roman control of the
Hellenistic world in the second century BCE, the Chinese control of its
Western Territory during the Han Dynasty, or the British control of India
before the 1858 annexation.
Today,
when we talk of empires, we most readily think of territorial entities,
which imply occupation and annexation. It is in this narrow sense that many
deny America to be an empire, as President Bush said in his 2003 Missions
Accomplished speech right after American troops took Bagdad: “Other nations
in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit.
Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to return home.” For
domination and control without annexation, some people talk about “informal
empire”, “benevolent empire”, or hegemony.
Hegemon and
imperium
A
Greek hegemon was originally the
supreme commander of a willing alliance. A prime example was the Athenian
leadership in the Greek alliance against Persia in the first part of the
fifth century BCE. The Athenians said they fought for security, honor, and
self-interest.[5] Greek historians
noted the significance of honor in the initial competition for hegemony,
when Athens yielded to Sparta for the good of the anti-Persian alliance and
assumed leadership only after Sparta abdicated. Thus hegemon did convey some sense of eminence and moral authority
in leadership.[6] This is also
apparent in Aristotle’s condition of just war: “to put us in a position to
exercise leadership [hegemon] –
but leadership directed to the interest of those who are ruled, and not to
the establishment of a general system of slavery.”[7]
As
the power of Persia declined, the power of Athens rose. Secured from common
foreign threats, self-interest came to overwhelm honor in Athenian
considerations. By brute force backed by a mighty navy, Athens forbade
withdrawal from its “alliance” and compelled others to join. It did not
annex “allies,” but imposed its own form of government on them, transferred
local lawsuits to Athens, extracted tributes to fund its own public
projects including the grand buildings on the Acropolis, militarily
protected its citizens to grab land in ally territories, and built up the
Athenian Empire, which lasted for five decades until the end of the
Peloponnesian War in 404 BCE.[8] The Athenian
attitude in interstate relations, as depicted in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, expressed a stark
realism epitomized by the vulgarized version of the Athenian remark to the Melians: “The strong do what they can, the weak suffer
what they must.”[9]
Not
surprisingly, the subject city-states hated the domination and called
Athens a polis tyrannos.
The Athenians knew this. When rebellions occurred, the great democratic
leader Pericles exhorted citizens to hang tough: “there is also involved
the loss of our empire and the dangers arising from the hatred which we
have incurred in administering it. . . . Your empire is now like a tyranny:
it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.”[10]
Observing
the change in Athenian behaviors, Greek historians withdrew the epithet hegemon and instead used arche for the
Athenian Empire. Arche generally meant rule, mainly the
government of a state, and the absence of rule is an-archia. Anarchy is the condition
of most international arenas, but not all. Two marked exceptions are arche and hegemon, which we call empire and hegemony.[11] Note that
although arche
lacks the sense of eminence in hegemon,
it is a neutral term distinct from the pejorative polis tyrannos. Whether an empire is
tyrannical or benevolent depends on the manner of its domination.
Political
territories, depicted as patches of color on the map, seem concrete, but
that is the concreteness in an abstract representation. Things are
different on the ground; think about how porous many national boundaries
are, even in today’s world. Power, the capacity to make others comply with
one’s desires, has no definite shape but is concrete in cognitive
relations. Even animals understand the meaning of teeth bared or tails
tucked. It is doubtful that a lion spraying landmarks has the notion of
reigning over a territory, but its assertion of power is not lost on potential
intruders.
Power
can be gained by military might. Maintenance of power requires proper
administration. The dominating power can rule indirectly through agents or
directly by annexing the territory. The problems of conquest and of rule
are not mutually exclusive, but neither should they be conflated. To defeat
the enemy is often much easier than to rule the conquered populace, as is
demonstrated by the conditions in Iraq after President Bush’s Missions
Accomplished speech. The Chinese of the warring states knew this well, as
the general Wu Qi wrote, “to be victorious is easy, to preserve the fruits
of victory difficult.”[12] That was why they
often resorted to hegemony, alliance, and other means to maintain
interstate balance of power. Qin refrained from swallowing its six rivals
for a long time. Massive annexation to create a unified China occurred
within a decade, and the rapidity was a major cause of its downfall. The
Roman Republic was an avid expansionist in power but less avid in expanding
territory; it preferred indirect rule under many circumstances. For this
reason, some modern writers call the Republic’s relation with Hellenistic
states “hegemonial imperialism.”[13] The qualification
would be superfluous for the Romans. “Empire” derives from the Roman imperium. As supreme experts in
control, the Romans had include both senses of power domination and
territorial occupation in imperium.
Their overseas diplomacy usually consisted of an ultimatum of harsh terms
from the Senate, often without prior negotiations, with the message that if
the recipient did not wish to obey, they could expect a war with Rome. The
legions came, won, systematically looted, and retreated. The victim learned
to obey Rome’s imperium.[14]
What
Livy and other Latin writers called imperium,
the Greek Polybius, the first historian to record Rome’s rise to empire,
rendered as arche.[15] Imperium originally meant command,
especially the supreme power of the Roman magistrates. The imperium populi
Romani meant the sway or supremacy of the Romans over other peoples.[16] It connoted
power. Not until the mid first century BCE did a
clear territorial connotation appear and imperium Romanum begin to take on the
meaning of the Roman empire as we understand it today, a polity with
delimited territory divided into regional provinces directly ruled by Rome
or the emperor.[17] Even then the
domineering connotation persisted, as in Rome’s claim of imperium orbis
terrae, power or mastery over the whole
world, which extended beyond its provinces.[18]
The
above analysis reveals functional
and moral distinctions in talks
about hegemony and empire. In terms of political function, hegemony means
leadership and indirect control without territorial implication, while
empire can mean either indirect control or the direct rule of annexed
territories. In terms of moral quality, empire seems to be neutral, while
hegemony originally implies preeminence; greatness lies less in great power
than in the self-restraint in exercising it, as a superior leader wins
loyalty less by coercive force than by moral authority. Both functional and
moral distinctions are present in the empirical Chinese notions of wang and ba.
The empirical notion of ba
The
five centuries prior to unification in 221 BCE were most important for
Chinese thoughts in international relations, not only because it was the
time of Confucius and other masters that produced the canons of Chinese
classics. The fragmentation into many contending states of equal status
necessitated innovations for maintaining the balance of power. The
centuries divide about equally into two periods. The first was
traditionally known as the Spring and Autumn period. At its beginning, over
a thousand city-sized states coexisted, which would gradually coalesce into
a handful of contiguous territorial “warring states,” for which the second
period is named. The states frequently went to war, against each other or
against intruding pastoralists from the hills and grasslands.[19] The interstate
situation somehow resembled the contemporary Greek world with its hundreds
of belligerent city-states, or the early Roman Republic among numerous
polities in Italy.
This
was the period of the ba 霸
or hegemon. Ba was also called bo 伯, the eldest brother among lords. A ba was a
leader of lords who rallied lesser states, presided over interstate
conferences, arbitrated disputes, upheld some norms of behavior, demanded
tribute and military levy, commanded allied troops against common enemies,
and interfered in limited internal affairs of other states.[20] He had more
civilian roles than the Greek hegemon,
but the idea of a preeminent interstate leader was similar.
The
first ba,
Lord Huan of Qi, arose at a time of external
threats. Under his leadership the lords of various states gathered fifteen
times. In military campaigns, they repelled pastoralist invasions and
reconstituted overrun states. In diplomatic conferences, they made
covenants about things such as forbidding crooked levees or restriction of
grain sales.[21] For example, a
fierce pastoralist invasion in 660 BCE destroyed the state of Wei, leaving
only hundreds of survivors. Lord Huan sent an
army to drive off the pastoralist and gather several allies to build a new
city for Wei, which was able to recover.[22] After Qi
declined, the contest for hegemony between Jin and Chu became the motif of
interstate relations that accounted for most wars in a century.
Looking
back from the late warring-state period, the Confucian master Xunzi wrote: “Wang
(the king) strives to win people, ba (the hegemon) strives to win allies, qiang
(the strong) strives to win territories.” The first two are virtuous, “the
prevalence of yi (義righteousness or justice) makes a king, the
prevalence of xin
(信trustworthiness)
makes a hegemon.” The strong who relies only on military might is in great
peril.[23]
In
terms of political function, Xungzi’s wang and ba resemble
empire and hegemony. The king who wins people usually rules directly, but
territorial reign is not the major consideration. In terms of morality, the
king’s virtue is explicitly emphasized and extolled, which distinguishes
him from the morally neutral empire. The king and the hegemon exemplify
different virtues to suit their different political functions.
Nevertheless, they both have moral authority, which set them apart from the
strongman, a semblance of the polis tyrannos.
The
Greek hegemon fought for honor.
Much honor resides in keeping one’s promises and maintaining one’s
integrity and trustworthiness. Thus the Romans strived to keep faith with
their allies, as Cicero wrote, “The foundation of justice is good faith, in
other words truthfully abiding by our words and agreements.”[24] Like the Roman fides, the Chinese xin never
ceased to be an ideal. Much was grandiloquent and failures were legion.
Nevertheless, for a long period the two peoples did try hard to keep up a
reputation of good faith. The extend Romans went to keep oaths was
legendary. Hannibal released ten Roman prisoners as representatives to
negotiate terms of ransom upon the oath that they return. After Rome refused to ransom
its war captives, nine of the ten went back to face slavery. The tenth, who
previously returned to pick up something, tried to trick his way out but
were sent back under public guards.[25] Such stories from
Roman and Chinese literatures could be multiplied. When Lord Huan of Qi first bid for hegemony, a Lu minister in a
diplomatic meeting held him at dagger point and demanded the return of Lu
lands that Qi took in previous wars. He agreed but, furious afterwards,
wanted to renege. His chief minister Guan Zhong,
whose help was instrumental to his hegemony, admonished: “No. If you grab
small advantages for self-gratification and abandon trustworthiness with
the lords, you will lose the world’s support. Return the lands.” He did.[26]
To
err is human. One can readily find great faults with eminent political
leaders. Nevertheless, the empirical notions of ba and hegemon convey an aspiration to do the right thing, whether
practices live up to that aspiration. This aspiration lives in the notion
of American hegemony as a benevolent empire. Chinese of the Spring and
Autumn period would understand. However, today’s Chinese would be baffled,
because the notion of ba had been demonized.
The ideological notions of WANG and BA
Confucius
often discussed the hegemons with his disciples. He praised the hegemonic
deeds of Lord Huan and Guan Zhong
for protecting the people and bequeathing benefits for ages to come.[27] In contrast,
Mengzi claimed that Lord Huan and other hegemon
were so despicable they were below discussion, and were never discussed in
Confucian schools. He poured scorn on Guan Zhong
and bristled at hearing people’s praises for him.[28].
Confucius
respected historical facts and was comfortable with the empirical notions
of ba
and wang.
Mengzi brushed aside facts and the empirical notions. In their place he
introduced the ideological notions BA
and WANG: “WANG dispenses benevolence with virtue, BA appropriates benevolence by force.”[29] Political
functions are disregarded. The only criterion is morality, on which the two
sit at extremes opposing each other: WANG
monopolizes morality, BA is
immoral.[30]
The
Greek historians withdrew the sterling epithet hegemon for Athens because of its changed behavior. In
contrast, Confucius and Mengzi were concerned with the same actions of Lord
Huan and other historical hegemons, only Mengzi
raised the moral bar to degrade them in one broad brush. Mengzi’s judgment
was subjective and dogmatic. Lord Huan had won
the support of allies and the gratitude of the people, but Mengzi condemned
him anyway because of their allegedly incorrect motives. On the other hand,
he extolled ancient sage kings as paradigms of the benevolent WANG, disregarding as false evidence
of their cruel deeds.
Mengzi’s
anti-hegemon stance is based on his anti-utility doctrine. He made
righteousness and utility into polar extremes and regarded any
consideration of beneficial utility hazardous to the state.[31] Unlike Xunzi, who appreciated the importance of
political-institutional, economic, and military factors in interstate
relation, Mengzi blamed them for being forceful and interfering with
benevolence. He advocated punishing generals, diplomats, and officers
leading land reclamation and distribution.[32] The sage king is
not contaminated by utilitarian considerations, his pure benevolence would
attract people like children to their father. Morality suffices.[33] Mengzi’s mantra
for government and interstate relations is: “The benevolent is invincible.”[34]
Mengzi
was the fourth generation disciple of Confucius. Chronologically, he came
between Confucius and Xunzi. In the Confucian
Orthodoxy, he is the sage second only to the master, while the realistic Xunzi does not even have a seat. Mengzi’s writing was
one of the Four Books that became the standard text for the imperial civil
service examination. His ideology of extreme moralization gained influence
as Confucian officers dominated the imperial bureaucracy. Following
Mengzi’s teaching, the hegemon came to be identified as an immoral bully
who knows only force. To the Chinese ear, American hegemony sounds anything
but euphemistic.
Mengzi’s
ideology of the benevolent WANG was
effective in the moral propaganda by which imperial Confucian officers
clobbered opponents and bolstered their own power. If it were more
substantive, it might be compared to the Cold-War era ideologies of
Liberalism and Communism. In terms of government and policy making, vacuity
and impracticality are its perennial criticisms.
While
serving as high minister in the state of Qi, Mengzi applied the ideology of
WANG in the policy recommendation
for Qi’s annexation of Yan. It proved to be a fiasco as great as the 2003 American-led
invasion of Iraq. A succession crisis plunged the state of Yan into
internal turmoil. Qi wanted to take advantage of it. Mengzi invented a moral
reason for invasion as flimsy as Saddam Hussein’s nonexistent weapons of
mass destruction. Qi took Yan as easily as America took Iraq. Qi regarded
it as heaven’s decree while America thought it mission accomplished. Mengzi
conjured up an image of Yan people welcoming Qi troops with food and drink,
just as the Iraqis were said to dance in the street in celebration of
liberation. Based on Qi’s alleged winning over of Yan’s people, Mengzi
urged Qi’s king to emulate the paradigms of WANG and annex Yan. He invoked “people’s hearts” as often as
Americans talked about winning the hearts and mind of the Iraqis, but
neither cared to find out what the people really wanted. At that time in
China, seven warring states were playing a delicate game of balance of
power, just as the Middle East was a delicate international theater.
However, Mengzi never considered the possible reactions of the other states
in urging annexation, just as America failed to fully appreciate the
ramifications of the invasion on the Middle East. It was no surprise that
the other five warring states responded by invading Qi to save Yan. Qi
occupied Yan for only two years, but its reluctant withdrawal did not
diminish Yan’s hatred. Yan’s revenge attack would plunged Qi into a
terminal decline.[35] Can the WANG ideology play a constructive
role in today’s international relations?
(March
2015)
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